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Adrian M. S. Piper 
 
This discussion treats a set of familiar social derelictions as consequences 
of the perversion of a universalistic moral theory in the service of an ill-
considered or insufficiently examined personal agenda.1 The set includes 
racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and class elitism, among other 
similar pathologies, under the general heading of discrimination. The 
perversion of moral theory from which these derelictions arise, I argue, 
involves restricting its scope of application to some preferred subgroup of the 
moral community of human beings. Those who try to justify rejection of the 
stringent requirements of universalistic moral theory on the grounds that it is 
too demanding, distant, or alienating properly to govern our behavior often 
mean to restrict its scope of application to one's friends, family, colleagues, 
and loved ones without regard to whom, in particular, such a subgroup 
includes. The following analysis of higher-order discrimination suggests that 
we often select the individuals who constitute such subgroups for reasons that 
we ourselves would reject on moral grounds were we to examine them 
carefully, but that we choose instead to put our rational resources in the 
service of avoiding any such examination at all costs. The implication is that 
arguments that truncate the scope of moral theory in fact justify bestowing the 
gift of moral treatment on a select few who deserve it no more than the many 
from whom we withhold it. Therefore, it would be precipitous to conclude 
that universalistic moral theory can be legitimately restricted in its practical 
scope of application in any way at all. 
 
                                                
1
 This paper is excerpted from chapter 12 of Rationality and the Structure of the Self, work 
on which was supported by an Andrew Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship at Stanford 
University and a Woodrow Wilson International Research Fellowship. Earlier versions 
were delivered to the Philosophy Department at George Washington University, the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics of Georgetown University, Howard University, the 
University of Mississippi, the City College of New York, the University of Maryland, 
and the Boston Area Conference on Character and Morality, hosted by Radcliffe and 
Wellesley Colleges (Nancy Sherman commenting). I have benefitted from these 
discussions and particularly from the remarks of Nancy Sherman and Kenneth P. 
Winkler on the issues addressed in section 1. Laurence Thomas provided extensive 
comments on an earlier draft. 
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1. Reciprocal First-Order Discrimination 
By first-order discrimination I mean what we ordinarily understand by 
the term "discrimination" in political contexts: a manifest attitude in which a 
particular attribute of a person that is irrelevant to judgments of that person's 
noninstrumental value or competence, e.g., her race, gender, sexual 
orientation, class background, or religious or ethnic affiliation, is seen as a 
source of disvalue or incompetence, in general, as a source of inferiority.2 I 
shall call an attribute so perceived a primary disvalued attribute, and a person 
perceived as bearing such an attribute the disvaluee. Conversely, I shall call 
any such arbitrary attribute seen as a source of value or superiority a primary 
valued attribute, and a person perceived as bearing such an attribute the valuee. 
Instances of first-order discrimination are familiar targets of moral 
condemnation because they disvalue individuals for having attributes 
perceived as primary disvalued attributes that are not in actuality sources of 
disvalue. But how should we evaluate what I will call reciprocal first-order 
discrimination, in which the attribute is perceived as a primary valued attribute 
and its bearers elevated accordingly? Are such attributes ever relevant to 
judgments of a person's noninstrumental value or competence? Take the case 
in which we are particularly drawn to befriend a valuee with whom we share 
a similar ethnic background because we expect to have more in common 
(lifestyle, tastes, sense of humor), share similar values, or see the world from a 
similar perspective. In this kind of case the primary valued attribute is not, 
say, being Jewish but rather having the same ethnic background, whatever 
that may be. Is similarity of ethnic background an attribute that is relevant to 
our judgments of how valuable the valuee is as a friend? No, for it does not 
form any part of the basis for such a judgment. That a friendship is better, 
richer, or more valuable in proportion to the degree of similarity of the 
friends' ethnic backgrounds is a judgment few would be tempted to make. 
In these cases it is not the valuee's similar ethnicity itself that is the source 
of value but rather the genuinely valuable attributes - for example, similarity 
of values or worldview - with which we expect similar ethnicity to be 
conjoined. Rather than making a normative judgment about his value or 
                                                
2
 I restrict the discussion to consideration of noninstrumental value or competence as 
determined by principles of justice and equality. The contrast is with instrumental value 
or competence in furthering some specified social or institutional policy of the sort that 
would figure in arguments that would justify, e.g., hiring a black person to provide a 
role model in a classroom or to provide a unique and needed perspective in a business 
venture or court of law, refusing to sell real estate in a certain neighborhood to a black 
family solely because doing so would lower property values, hiring a woman to a 
professional position solely to meet affirmative action quotas, or refusing to serve 
Asians at one's family diner solely because it would be bad for business. 
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competence as a friend in this case, we in fact make an epistemic judgment 
about the probability that because of the valuee's ethnic identity, he will bear 
attributes susceptible of such normative judgments. These epistemic rules of 
thumb are defeasible and may have disappointing consequences for personal 
relationships. For they ascribe primary value to a kind of attribute at the 
expense of others that are in fact more important for friendship - like 
sensitivity, similarity of tastes or experiences, and mutual respect - with 
which that kind of attribute is only contingently, if ever, conjoined. 
(Presumably something like this may explain the malaise of someone who has 
chosen all the "right" friends, married the "right" spouse, and landed the "best" 
job yet feels persistently unhappy, disconnected, and dissatisfied in his social 
relationships.) 
If similarity of race, gender, sexual orientation, class background, or 
religious or ethnic affiliation are in themselves irrelevant to judgments of a 
person's noninstrumental value or competence, primary valued attributes 
such as being of a particular race, gender, etc., are even more obviously so. At 
least it has yet to be demonstrated that any particular racial, ethnic, gender, 
class or religious group possesses the attributes necessary for, e.g., friendship 
to an outstanding degree.3 Epistemic probability judgments about the 
concatenation of any such primary valued attributes with genuinely valuable 
traits, such as sensitivity or similarity of interests, may also bias our ability to 
perceive clearly the attributes a particular individual actually has, as when a 
wife minimizes the reality and seriousness of her husband's physical abuse of 
her because of the weight she accords to his class background. This would be 
a case of reciprocal first-order discrimination, according to the above 
definition, because she sees as a (compensating) source of superiority a 
primary valued attribute, class background, that is irrelevant to judgments of 
the valuee's noninstrumental value or competence as a spouse. 
It might be objected that we need such epistemic rules of thumb, however 
irrational or poorly grounded, in order to survive in a world of morally 
opaque others. How ought we behave, for example, alone in a subway car 
with four black male teenagers carrying ghetto blasters and wearing running 
shoes? However, while we may need rules of thumb to get along in the world, 
it is fairly obvious that we are not getting along all that well in the world with 
the rules of thumb we have. Even if it were true that most muggers were black 
male teenagers in running shoes, it still would not follow that most black male 
teenagers in running shoes were muggers. It might be a mistake on quite a 
                                                
3
 The thesis that women make better friends is often supported by arguments to the 
effect that they become closer confidants more quickly. But there are many other attributes 
that contribute to friendship - e.g., trustworthiness, loyalty, dependability, honesty, 
mutual respect, etc. - that such arguments do not address. 
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large scale (as self-fulfilling prophesies often are) to react to every such person 
we encounter as though he were. The consequences of acting on the rules of 
thumb on which we now tend to rely do not inspire sufficient confidence to 
warrant our continued unquestioning allegiance to them. 
Alternately, one may make a judgment of value about some such 
attribute abstractly and independently considered. One may value being 
black, or of working class origins, for its own sake. Or one may choose a 
partner from the same religion because one views that religion and its 
traditions themselves as intrinsically valuable, independently of one's 
partner's compatibility with respect to lifestyle, values, or worldview. Here 
the judgment of value is directed not at the valuee's value or competence but 
rather at the attribute he bears, to the preservation of which one's choice of 
him is instrumental. Nothing in the following discussion addresses or 
precludes such judgments, although there is much to say about them. My 
target is judgments of noninstrumental value about individuals, not about 
attributes of individuals abstractly and independently considered. 
Is it humanly possible to value a person just because she bears some such 
primary valued attribute - not because of the further attributes with which we 
expect that one to be conjoined but just for the sake of that attribute in itself? It 
is difficult to make sense of this. Suppose that I value Germanness because the 
Germans I have known tend to have deep passions and an amusingly 
fatalistic sense of humor and that I then meet a shallow and phlegmatic 
German with no sense of humor at all. In the absence of other, unexpectedly 
attractive personality characteristics I may appreciate, just what is it about 
being German in itself that is supposed to confer worth on this particular 
individual? Either we must be able to spell out an answer to this question in 
terms of other attributes that are only contingently connected, if at all, to this 
one - e.g., having been socialized within a certain culture "from the inside," 
being part of a certain historical tradition, etc. - or else we are appealing to a 
mysterious and ineffable, nonnatural quality of Germanness.4 Then suppose 
that there are such qualities and that we may arguably appeal to them. To 
what degree might Germanness outweigh the person's other attributes that, 
                                                
4
 For purposes of this discussion I ignore the range of cases in which my valuation of, 
e.g., Germanness is rooted in the status or worth I expect my choice of German friends 
to confer on me. This kind of case occurs both in situations in which the valued attribute 
is one shared by oneself and in those in which it is not. Thus it may happen that one's 
choice of a white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant spouse is made in part with an eye to 
reinforcing the value of one's own status as a white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant, or 
alternately, that one's choice of a black spouse is made with an eye to highlighting one's 
rejection of the policy of "remaining with one's own kind." These are all cases in which 
the attribute is valued as a source of instrumental value or competence, i.e., its ability to 
confer value on the evaluator. Therefore, they are irrelevant to my argument. 
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by hypothesis, I deplore? Surely, the mere fact of Germanness can provide no 
consolation at all, in practice, for other attributes of the person that offend me. 
It will not compensate, for example, for a failure to laugh at my jokes or a 
tendency to discuss the weather at excessive length or to fall asleep at the 
opera. And then it is hard to see in what its purported value consists. 
Independently of the other, genuinely valuable attributes with which 
they are only contingently, if at all, conjoined, attributes such as race, gender, 
sexual orientation, class background, and religious or ethnic affiliation are in 
themselves always irrelevant to judgments of a person's noninstrumental 
value or competence. This holds whether they are considered as primary 
disvalued or valued attributes and even where they are used as epistemic 
rules of thumb for detecting such attributes. We may, in fact, feel compelled to 
make such judgments, in the service of expediency or what we imagine to be 
our self-interest, and screen our circle of associates accordingly. But it is 
nothing to be proud of. In what follows, I will focus primarily on some 
consequences of cases in which these and other, similar attributes are seen as 
sources of disvalue, i.e., on first-order discrimination rather than reciprocal 
first-order discrimination. My thesis will be that we have reason to scrutinize 
our social behavior even in situations in which we sincerely believe ourselves 
to be above both types of discrimination. 
 
2. Higher-Order Political Discrimination 
By second-order discrimination I will understand the attitude within which 
a primary disvalued attribute in turn confers disvalue respectively on further 
attributes of the disvaluee. I shall refer to these latter as secondary disvalued 
attributes. 
Second-order discrimination works in the following way. A disvaluee's 
primary disvalued attribute, say, being a male homosexual, causes the 
second-order discriminator to view some further attribute of the disvaluee, 
say, being an eloquent speaker, in a negative light. The respect in which this 
further attribute is seen as negative depends on the range of possible 
descriptions it might satisfy, as well as the context in which it appears. Thus, 
for example, the second-order discriminator might view the disvaluee's 
eloquence as purple prose, as empty rhetoric, or as precious, flowery, or 
mannered. These predicates are not interchangeable for the second-order 
discriminator. Nor are they taken to be arbitrarily applied. The second-order 
discriminator will choose from among them to express his disvaluation in 
response to contingencies of the situation and individuals involved. The 
second-order discriminator may, in all sincerity, explain his disvaluation with 
reference to impartially applied aesthetic standards or to his ingrown, native 
suspicion of big words. But the crucial feature of second-order discrimination 
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is that the actual explanation for his disvaluing the person's eloquence, in 
whatever respect he disvalues it, is the person's primary disvalued attribute of 
being a male homosexual. 
Does second-order discrimination as thus defined ever actually occur? 
Some familiar examples of it include attaching disvalue to a person's having 
rhythm by reason of its putative connection with her being black, or attaching 
disvalue to a person's being very smart by reason of its putative connection 
with his being Jewish. Both of these cases are examples of discriminatory 
stereotyping in which some arbitrary attribute is falsely taken to be 
characteristic of persons of a particular race or ethnic or religious affiliation. 
But I mean to call attention to a slightly different feature of these examples. 
Someone who practices second-order discrimination regards a black person 
who has rhythm as vulgar, salacious, offensive, or at the very least, 
undignified. Similarly, such a person regards .a Jewish person who is very 
smart as sophistical, glib, crafty, subversive, ungentlemanly, nor at the very 
least, untrustworthy. In both cases, attributes that are in themselves salutary, 
or at least neutral, are castigated by the second-order discriminator by reason 
of the disvalue conferred on them by the primary disvalued attribute. This is 
what makes them examples of second-order discrimination. 
These familiar, stereotypic examples of second-order discrimination do 
not exhaust the repertoire of higher-order discrimination for many reasons. 
First, orders of discrimination can, in theory, be multiplied indefinitely. So, for 
example, a case of third-order discrimination would involve what I shall call 
tertiary disvalued attributes: The primary disvalued attribute (being black, say) 
confers disvalue on a further, secondary disvalued attribute (having rhythm), 
which in turn confers disvalue on yet a further attribute of the person (being a 
good dancer, say). Having rhythm is seen as vulgar by reason of its 
association with being black, and being a good dancer is then seen as 
exhibitionistic (say) by reason of its association with having rhythm. In any 
such case the primary attribute is in fact irrelevant to judgments of a person's 
value or competence. Hence, the value or disvalue it confers on secondary, 
tertiary, etc., attributes is bogus. 
The n-order disvalue relation is transitive in that, for example, if being 
black confers disvalue on having rhythm and having rhythm confers disvalue 
on being a good dancer, then being black confers disvalue on being a good 
dancer. The n-order disvalue relation is also inclusive in that the primary 
disvalued attribute poisons the higher-order discriminator's evaluations of all 
further attributes of the disvaluee. For example, the primary disvalued 
attribute of being black may confer disvalue, alternatively, on a dancer's 
classical styling: classical styling in a black dancer may be seen as 
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inappropriate or as an obscene parody of traditional ballet.5 The primary 
disvalued attribute also confers disvalue on other, unrelated attributes of the 
disvaluee: her appearance, accent, mode of dress, etc.6 
The inclusiveness of the n-order-disvalue relation underscores a second 
reason why stereotypical cases of second-order discrimination do not exhaust 
the repertoire of higher-order discrimination: non-stereotypical traits are also 
recruited to receive disvalue from primary disvalued attributes to suit 
particular occasions. We do not ordinarily think of classical styling in dance as 
an attribute about which discriminators might have any particular attitude. 
But this may be mistaken. Higher-order discrimination is not concerned solely 
with stereotypical secondary, tertiary, etc., disvalued attributes. It may be 
concerned with any further attributes of the person on which the primary 
disvalued attribute itself confers disvalue. Thus, for example, being Jewish (or 
black or a woman) may confer disvalue on being smart, which in turn may 
confer disvalue on being intellectually prolific. A person's intellectual 
prolificity may be seen as evidence of logorrhea, or lack of critical conscience, 
and may thus poison the evaluation of those intellectual products themselves. 
We do not ordinarily think of intellectual prolificity as an attribute about 
which discriminators have any particular attitude, either. But this too may be 
                                                
5
 Of course, there are other, more convoluted cases of higher-order discrimination that 
represent epicyclic variations on the straightforward cases I shall be examining. For 
example, being black may wildly exaggerate the value attached to classical styling in a 
black dancer if classical styling is perceived as something the person had to overcome 
great innate and cultural obstacles to achieve. In either case, being black functions as a 
primary disvalued attribute because it carries a presumption of inferiority into the 
evaluation of further attributes of the person. 
6
 Is it perhaps too strong to claim that a primary disvalued attribute poisons the higher-
order discriminator's evaluation of all of the disvaluee's other attributes? Can't a higher-
order discriminator respect a disvaluee's traits of character in a certain restricted area 
despite his disvalued status? I am inclined to think not. For 
this seems to occur almost exclusively when the "valued" attribute itself conforms to the 
higher-order discriminator's stereotypes. For example, a black man may be admired for 
his athletic prowess but encounter hostility when he runs for political office. In such 
cases the higher-order discriminator's admiration and respect for the stereotypical trait 
is not unalloyed. It is tempered by a certain smug complacency at the disvaluee's 
confirmation of his disvalued status in the very cultivation and expression of that 
stereotypical trait. To sustain the above objection, we would need to see a higher-order 
discriminator exhibiting unalloyed admiration and respect for nonstereotypical traits in 
such a way that these positive feelings did not, in turn, positively reform the higher-order 
discriminator's prejudicial attitude toward the person's primary disvalued attribute. Someone 
who sincerely respects and admires a disvaluee for nonstereotypical reasons without 
feeling threatened or invaded has already begun to weaken the psychological edifice on 
which her discriminatory evaluation of the person as a disvaluee is based. 
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mistaken. A first test for ascertaining whether the disvalue of some attribute 
of a person is to be explained as a case of higher-order discrimination is to 
ascertain whether or not that attribute is disvalued uniformly across 
individuals, regardless of anything that might count as a primary disvalued 
attribute for a higher-order discriminator. If someone is just as contemptuous 
of Fred Astaire's having rhythm as they are of Michael Jackson's, or just as 
contemptuous of intellectual prolificity in Balzac as in Isaac Asimov, then the 
charge of higher-order discrimination may be defeated.7 
A third reason why stereotypical cases of second-order discrimination do 
not exhaust the repertoire of higher-order discrimination is that stereotypes 
change in accordance with changes in the objects of discrimination as different 
populations seek access to the goods, services, and opportunities enjoyed by 
the advantaged, and primary and higher-order disvalued attributes change 
accordingly. For instance, the anti-Semitic response to the attempts of Jewish 
intellectuals to achieve full assimilation into the institutions of higher 
education in this country frequently found expression in the disvaluative 
description of assertively ambitious Jewish academics as pushy or 
opportunistic. Now similarly situated blacks and women frequently enjoy 
that title. Conversely, those with such primary disvalued attributes who 
attempt to substitute diplomacy for assertion are characterized by higher-
order discriminators as manipulative, obsequious, or sycophantic. A second 
                                                
7
 It might be thought that this first test is inherently self-limiting for the case in which 
the person happens to dislike, e.g., just the attribute that is most typically associated 
with a certain race (dark skin) but nevertheless passes the first test in that she disvalues 
it uniformly across individuals, whether it occurs in blacks, East 
Indians, Jews, Arabs, Aborigines, or Coppertone-soaked Californians. I think what we 
should say about this kind of case is that it does not present a problem. The fact that 
someone is acquitted of being a racist doesn't imply that her evaluations are therefore 
admirable or enlightened. Any predicate or combination of predicates that fails the first 
test is either a rigged definite description of a particular disvalued group, e.g., "ova-
producing featherless bipeds," or else describes a discriminatory stereotype, e.g., "dark-
skinned, dark-eyed, woolly haired individuals with rhythm." Of course, a person might 
just happen to disvalue only individuals who fit such a stereotype and not those who 
violate it. But since this disvaluation would not be independent of anything that might 
count as a primary disvalued attribute for such a person, it would not defeat the charge 
of higher-order discrimination. 
Note, however, that the first test does not work for identifying a distinct but 
related attitude, which we might call generalized higher-order discrimination, in which a 
person comes to disvalue some constellation of higher-order attributes across the board 
specifically because of its original association with a primary disvalued attribute 
stereotypically ascribed to a certain group. Someone who finds having rhythm vulgar in 
any dancer, regardless of racial or ethnic affiliation, because he associates having rhythm 
with blacks, whom he fears and despises, would exemplify such an attitude. 
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test for ascertaining whether or not the disvalue of some attribute of a person 
is to be explained as a case of higher-order discrimination is to ascertain 
whether there is any alternative attribute, conduct, or manner directed toward 
the same goal of gaining access to unjustly withheld social advantages that 
avoids or deflects the disvalue conferred by the primary disvalued attribute. If 
there is not - if, that is, whatever your strategy, you're damned if you do and 
damned if you don't - then the charge of higher-order discrimination is prima 
facie justified. 
 
3. Nonstereotypical Higher-Order Discrimination 
A fourth reason why stereotypical cases of second-order discrimination 
do not exhaust the repertoire of higher-order discrimination is that other 
arbitrary attributes, not just the familiar political ones, can function as 
primary disvalued attributes to a higher-order discriminator. Physical 
appearance, style of diction, social bearing, familial, educational, or 
professional pedigree, circle of associates, and manner of dress are among the 
more familiar, if less widely acknowledged, objects of higher-order 
discrimination. Some of these attributes are often assumed to go hand-in-hand 
with, or even to be partially definitive of, more widely recognized primary 
disvalued attributes. For example, higher-order discriminators may tend to 
assume that ethnic identity is inherently connected with a certain physical 
appearance (Jews have dark, curly hair and long noses), that racial identity is 
connected with a certain style of diction and class background (blacks speak 
Black English and come from the ghetto), or that gender identity is connected 
with a certain social bearing (women are sympathetic, passive, and 
emotional). This is how a stereotype is formed. But again, I mean to call 
attention to a slightly different point: these attributes themselves may be seen 
as sources of disvalue independently of their possible connection with such 
stereotypically primary disvalued attributes. Someone who has all of the 
valued race, ethnic, religious, class, and gender attributes but lacks the valued 
style of diction, mode of self-presentation, or educational or professional 
pedigrees may be subject to higher-order discrimination just as fully as 
someone who lacks all of the former attributes but has all of the latter. In both 
cases this means that their other attributes - their personality characteristics, 
interests, or achievements - will be seen as higher-order disvalued attributes 
by reason of their association with these equally arbitrary primary disvalued 
attributes. 
This shows that the first-order political discrimination with which we are 
familiar is merely a special case of a more general psychological phenomenon 
that is not limited to first-order political discrimination at all. However, 
higher-order discrimination usually includes it, for it would be 
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psychologically unusual, to say the least, to find an individual who is in 
general corrupt in his evaluations of a person's other attributes in the ways 
just described, yet impartial and scrupulous in his evaluations of blacks, Jews, 
women, gays, etc., and their attributes. Someone who is apt to dislike a person 
because of her hair texture or accent or family lineage or mode of dress can 
hardly be expected to be genuinely judicious when it comes to judging her 
gender, race, sexual orientation, class background, or ethnic or religious 
affiliation. Hence, we can expect that first-order political discrimination and 
higher-order discrimination in general are to be found together. 
 
4. Reciprocal Higher-Order Discrimination 
A fifth reason why familiar, stereotypic examples of second-order 
discrimination do not exhaust the repertoire of higher-order discrimination is 
that higher-order discrimination as so far described implies a companion 
phenomenon, which I shall call reciprocal higher-order discrimination. This is 
what occurs when attributes irrelevant to judgments of a person's competence 
or worth are seen as primary valued attributes, as sources of value that then 
confer value on the person's secondary, tertiary, etc., attributes. Any one of 
the primary attributes enumerated so far may have this function. For example, 
a person's gender may be perceived as conferring value on secondary 
attributes, such as his competence to hold a certain professional position. Or a 
person's familial lineage may be perceived as conferring value on her 
admissibility to an institution of higher education. Or a person's class 
background may be perceived as conferring value on his manner of dress. Or 
a person's educational pedigree may be perceived as conferring value on her 
political pronouncements, which in turn confer value on her personal lifestyle, 
and so on. Each of these examples have an arbitrary and irrational quality to 
them. That is because reciprocal higher-order discrimination, like higher-
order discrimination itself, is an arbitrary and irrational attitude. 
Higher-order discrimination and reciprocal higher-order discrimination 
are materially interdependent. If a person's having a particular racial identity 
is a source of disvalue for a higher-order discriminator, then if someone lacks 
that racial identity, they are not seen as tainted by that disvalue. For example, 
if a person's being Oriental confers disvalue on his attempts at tact, i.e., if he is 
therefore perceived as particularly evasive and inscrutable, then if he were 
white, he would not be perceived as similarly evasive and inscrutable. For if a 
higher-order discriminator recognized that one can be just as evasive and 
inscrutable without being Oriental, say if one has a hidden agenda or lacks 
social skills, then it would have to be recognized that those attributes, rather 
than his being Oriental, might be conferring disvalue on his attempts at tact. 
Conversely, if a person's having a particular racial identity is a source of value 
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for a higher-order discriminator, then someone who lacks that racial identity 
is not blessed by that value. For example, if a person's being white confers 
value on his attempts as tact, i.e., if he is therefore viewed as sensitive and 
reasonable, then if he were Oriental, he would not be perceived as similarly 
sensitive and reasonable. For if a higher-order discriminator recognized that 
one can be just as sensitive and reasonable without being white, say if one has 
no personal investment in the issue or has thought hard about it, then it 
would have to be recognized that those attributes, rather than his being white, 
might be conferring value on his attempts at tact. 
The two tests for higher-order discrimination apply analogously to 
reciprocal higher-order discrimination: (1) Ascertain whether or not the 
higher-order valued attribute is valued uniformly across individuals, 
regardless of anything that might count as a primary valued attribute for the 
discriminator. If a person's perceived competence to hold a certain 
professional position would not be in any way diminished if she were black 
(if, that is, blacks with comparable competence have been hired to such 
positions) or if the perceived value of a person's political pronouncements 
would not be in any way diminished if he had a different educational 
pedigree (if, that is, comparable political pronouncements on the part of 
others who lack that educational pedigree are similarly valued), then the 
charge of reciprocal higher-order discrimination may be defeated. (2) 
Ascertain whether there is any alternative attribute, conduct, or manner 
directed toward the same goal of gaining access to some social advantage that 
avoids or deflects the value conferred by the primary valued attribute. If there 
is not - if, for example, whether you are assertively ambitious or carefully 
diplomatic, intellectually prolific or intellectually fallow, you can do no wrong 
- then the charge of reciprocal higher-order discrimination is prima facie 
justified.8 Henceforth I will take higher-order discrimination to include 
                                                
8
 Here it might be objected that the second test is inadequate to ascertain the existence of 
reciprocal higher-order discrimination, since the explanation for why "you can do no 
wrong" may be not that all such higher-order attributes receive value from primary 
valued attributes but rather that all such higher-order attributes are in any case 
irrelevant to judgments of a person's competence. However, remember that the second 
test applies specifically to attributes directed toward the goal of gaining access to some 
social advantage. This includes not only attributes irrelevant to the question of one's 
entitlement to that advantage, such as those pertaining to the manner or quality of one's 
self-promotion, but also attributes directly relevant to that question, such as those 
pertaining to one's status, potential, training, experience, etc. The second test sifts out 
those cases in which irrelevant higher-order attributes are made the basis for conferring 
the advantage, e.g., one's manner of self-promotion, and in which relevant higher-order 
attributes are discounted as the bases for conferring the advantage, e.g., one's previous 
professional experience. In both kinds of cases, higher-order discrimination is marked 
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reciprocal higher-order discrimination. These two phenomena demonstrate 
that one need not be a blatant racist, sexist, anti-Semite, snob, or homophobe - 
let us describe such an individual as a simple first-order discriminator - in order 
to practice political discrimination. Higher-order discrimination is given 
fullest expression indirectly, by implication, in seemingly unrelated tastes, 
preferences, and behavior. 
 
5. Higher-Order Discrimination: A Species of Pseudorationality 
So far I have used locutions like "seen as conferring value/disvalue on" 
and "by reason of its association with" to describe the relation between 
primary and higher-order disvalued or valued attributes without saying in 
any detail in what I take that relation to consist. It does not consist in the set of 
beliefs held by the higher-order discriminator to the effect that 
(1) a. agent A has primary disvalued attribute P, 
b. agent A has n-ary attribute N, and 
c. P confers negative value on N. 
The set (1) is faulty because of (c): only the most perverse and 
unrepentant higher-order discriminator would admit, even to herself, that it is 
P that confers negative value on N. On the other hand, only the most absurdly 
consistent higher-order discriminator would affirm the belief that, in virtue of 
(la) and (lb), 
c'. N is of negative value, period. 
This would be the plight of the higher-order discriminator who, in virtue 
of his contempt for Isaac Asimov's intellectual prolificity, would feel 
compelled to abjure Balzac as well. Instead, (c) must be replaced by 
c". N, in the way in which it is borne by A, is of negative value.  
Condition (c") is better because it incorporates that locution that scrupled 
higher-order discriminators are so reluctant or unable to further define. For 
the higher-order discriminator, there is just something about the way in which a 
person dances rhythmically that is vulgar, something about the way in which 
a person manifests their intelligence that is glib or sophistical, something 
about the way in which they attempt to gain access to social advantages that 
is unctuous or opportunistic. The higher-order discriminator would 
vehemently reject the suggestion that this "something" might have anything to 
do with the person's race, gender, sexual orientation, class background, or 
ethnic or religious affiliation. But in fact, it is precisely this primary disvalued 
attribute from which the blemish spreads. Let us, then, take the set of beliefs 
that 
                                                                                                     
by the relaxation or modification of the criteria of competence for receiving the advantage 
in order to accommodate the particular attributes of the valuee. 





© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
(2) a. agent A has primary disvalued attribute P, 
b. agent A has n-ary attribute N, and 
c". N, in the way in which it is borne by A, is of negative value, 
plus the stipulation that 
(3) For the higher-order discriminator, A's possession of P is what in fact 
confers negative value on N 
as characteristic of the typical (i.e., scrupulous) higher-order discriminator. 
What makes higher-order discriminators so scrupulous? What, that is, 
explains the higher-order discriminator's tendency to suppress (3)? Part of the 
answer lies in the nature of first-order discrimination. First-order 
discrimination can be understood as a species of pseudo-rationality that relies 
heavily on the mechanisms of rationalization and dissociation (Piper 1985, 
1988). In rationalization we apply a concept to something too broadly or too 
narrowly, magnifying the properties of the thing that instantiate the concept 
and minimizing those properties that fail to do so. The perception of 
someone's race, gender, sexual orientation, class background, ethnic or 
religious affiliation, etc., as a source of disvalue or value is the consequence of 
applying value concepts like "person," "human being," "citizen," "member of 
the community," "rational and responsible agent," etc., too narrowly to 
include only those individuals who have the primary valued attribute and to 
exclude those individuals who lack it. In dissociation we identify something in 
terms of the negation of the value concepts in question: identifying Jews as 
subhuman, blacks as childlike, gays as perverts, working class men and 
women as animals, or women in general as irrational, for example, are ways 
of obscuring one's identification of these individuals as fully mature, 
responsible human beings and thereby of obscuring one's recognition of these 
individuals as full members of the community with which one identifies.9 
These habits of thought indicate that first-order discriminators have a 
personal investment in the perversion of moral theory that results from 
restricting its scope of application to individuals viewed as relevantly similar 
to themselves (Piper 1987, 1988). Agent A is personally invested in some state 
of affairs t if the existence of t is a source of personal pleasure, satisfaction, or 
security to A; the nonexistence of t elicits feelings of dejection, deprivation, or 
anxiety from A; and these feelings are to be explained by A's identification 
                                                
9
 The irony in the case of racism is that there is a substantial literature in biology and the 
social sciences that indicates that almost all purportedly white Americans have between 
five and twenty percent black ancestry and hence are, according this country's 
entrenched "just one trace" convention of racial classification, black. See Williamson 
1974; Cavalli-Sforza and Bodmer 1971; T. E. Reed 1969; Workman, Blumberg, and 
Cooper 1963; Glass and Li 1953. For these references and discussion on this matter I am 
indebted to Professor Monro S. Edmonson of Tulane University's Department of 
Anthropology. 
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with t. A identifies with t if A is disposed to identify t as personally meaningful 
or valuable to A. The first-order discriminator identifies as personally 
meaningful a truncated moral theory that identifies only individuals of the 
same race, gender, sexual orientation, class background, or ethnic or religious 
affiliation as rational and responsible human beings and as full members of 
the moral community. Such a discriminator gets personal satisfaction and a 
sense of security from delimiting the moral community in this way and feels 
deep anxiety at the suggestion that this theory is false or inadequate (or, even 
more terrifying for the discriminator, that he or she may in fact violate it). 
Higher-order discrimination then adds to this constellation of habits of 
thought the pseudorational mechanism of denial, in which we suppress 
recognition of an anomalous thing or property altogether in order to preserve 
the internal consistency of our beliefs or theory about the world, ourselves, 
and other people. I have already argued that typically, higher-order 
discriminators are likely to be first-order discriminators as well, that is, that 
they have the same prejudices that incline them to view individuals with the 
primary disvalued attributes as inferior, not fully members of their 
community. The simple first-order discriminator experiences no conflict in 
categorizing disvaluees as inferior beings to be suppressed and exploited. 
Therefore, she has no need to exercise denial, either of her own discriminatory 
responses or of the disvaluees' existence. By contrast, higher-order 
discriminators must deny both in order to preserve the consistency of their 
beliefs. Because they are deeply affected, but not fully reformed, by 
arguments and experiences that suggest that first-order discrimination is 
unjust, both their own discriminatory responses and the objects of those 
responses are anathema to higher-order discriminators. Because they do not 
want to believe that their responses are discriminatory, they deny them 
altogether. The higher-order discriminator may deny, for example, that the 
primary disvalued attribute in question is a disvalue at all and yet helplessly 
deplore the "fact" that nevertheless there are no competent or worthy 
candidates bearing this attribute to be found, or he may hold any such 
candidate to a much higher standard of acceptance or performance than that 
which he ordinarily applies, relative to which her secondary attributes can be 
disparaged. He may denigrate her intelligence as cleverness or ridicule her for 
working too hard when she exhibits energy and commitment to her work or 
disparage her professional recognition as achieved through hustling or 
connections. 
Thus the higher-order discriminator's personal investment is in not 
merely the truncated moral theory embraced by the first-order discriminator. 
In the higher-order discriminator this is conjoined with an equally genuine 
personal investment in the more comprehensive moral theory that includes all 
human agents within its scope. The higher-order discriminator is too 
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intellectually sophisticated to avow explicitly, say, the view that blacks are 
childlike or that Jews are subhuman. Even to admit privately to herself that 
she held such a belief would be a source of embarrassment. Yet she does. 
Naturally, this conjunction engenders an inconsistent worldview in which, on 
the one hand, the truncated moral theory endorses the exclusive superiority of 
individuals relevantly similar to the discriminator but in which, on the other, 
the more comprehensive moral theory to which the higher-order 
discriminator also subscribes condemns discrimination against those in fact 
perceived - in accordance with the truncated theory - as morally inferior. In 
this funhouse worldview, first-order discrimination is rightly viewed from the 
perspective of the comprehensive theory as not only morally reprehensible 
but also vulgar. But as such it is, from the perspective of the truncated theory, 
of a piece with other perceived signs of inferiority, such as being of a different 
race, gender, sexual orientation, class background, or ethnic or religious 
affiliation, from any of which the higher-order discriminator views herself as 
exempt. The inconsistency of this worldview often results in a corresponding, 
detectable inconsistency in behavior: The higher-order discriminator often 
vacillates in her treatment of disvaluees between denial of their existence on 
the one hand and an exaggerated paternalistic attitude of noblesse oblige 
toward them on the other. Because the higher-order discriminator has a deep 
personal investment in a perversion of moral theory that flatly excludes 
disvaluees from its scope of application, she is, despite her best efforts, 
without the psychological resources for recognizing and treating a disvaluee 
as an equal or even clearly understanding what would be involved in doing 
so. 
Thus, like the first-order discriminator, the higher-order discriminator in 
fact categorizes such members of the disvalued group themselves in similarly 
demeaning terms with respect to their primary attributes but, unlike the first-
order discriminator, experiences a conflict of conscience about doing so. Faced 
with the conflict between first-order discriminatory habits of thought and the 
dictates of conscience, the higher-order discriminator exercises denial, above 
all in order to avoid this conflict by eradicating its source from awareness. The 
higher-order discriminator often fails to acknowledge the very existence or 
presence of members of the disvalued groups in order to circumvent his own 
first-order discriminatory responses to them.10 For instance, he may ignore or 
fail to acknowledge a disvaluee's contribution to a general discussion or 
respond to that contribution as though someone else had made it. Or he may 
                                                
10
 This may contribute to an explanation of the researched phenomenon (Schuman, 
Steeh, and Bobo 1985) that in the last twenty years, white support for the principles of 
equality and fairness for blacks have increased concurrently with white opposition to 
the implementation of those principles. 
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relegate a disvaluee to marginal or peripheral tasks in a professional setting. 
Or he may simply ignore the disvaluee altogether, avoiding all social 
interaction not strictly required by social or institutional obligations. In 
behaving in this fashion, the higher-order discriminator does not give vent to 
any sort of malevolent impulse. His aim is not to insult or injure the disvaluee 
in any way. Rather, his aim is to avoid the painfully conflicting feelings - of 
disgust or contempt on the one hand and the pangs of conscience on the other 
- that acknowledgement of the disvaluee provokes.11 
When social or institutional obligations make denial of the disvalee's 
presence impossible, denial of (at the very least) her primary disvalued 
attribute or of its perceived disvalue supplies a second-best resolution to this 
conflict of conscience: denial of the disvaluee's primary disvalued attribute 
suppresses from awareness the discriminatory habits of thought elicited by it 
and so preserves consistency by placating the requirements of conscience. 
This is why the higher-order discriminator tends to suppress (3). 
Unfortunately, to suppress habits of thought from awareness is not to 
eradicate their influence, any more than to suppress the disvaluee's existence 
from awareness is to eradicate her influence. Higher-order discrimination is 
characterized by that attitude in which a certain habit of thought, namely 
first-order discrimination, poisons one's evaluations and behavior, whether 
one acknowledges this or not. 
The higher-order discriminator is inclined, moreover, not to acknowledge 
this, no matter how obviously incriminating his evaluations and behavior 
may be to a disinterested observer. For this would expose the painful conflict 
of conscience that the higher-order discriminator's behavior attempts to 
suppress. To acknowledge this conflict would be to acknowledge the need to 
resolve it, i.e., the need to work through and overcome the first-order 
prejudices that gave rise to it. But it is precisely in virtue of those first-order 
prejudices themselves that such a project of self-improvement stands very low 
                                                
11
 Here the joke characterizing the difference between first-order racism in the South 
and in the North is relevant: in the South, it is said, whites don't mind how close a black 
person gets, as long as he doesn't get too big, while in the North, whites don't mind 
how big a black person gets, as long as he doesn't get too close. Only the higher-order 
discriminator of either region feels compelled to deny the existence of the black person 
altogether. 
Denial of a person's presence as a way of avoiding conflicting feelings about him is 
fairly common. A very handsome man may be the object of denial when others' feelings 
of attraction to him conflict with their conviction that these feelings are inappropriate. A 
very fortunate or charismatic person may be the object of denial when others' feelings of 
envy or resentment conflict with a similar conviction. Or a homely person may be the 
object of denial when others' feelings of repugnance conflict with their kindness or 
social good will. Higher-order discrimination is most analogous to this last case. 
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on the higher-order discriminator's list of priorities. Unlike the resolution of 
Oedipal conflicts, emotional problems, tensions in one's personal 
relationships, and career dilemmas, coming to terms with one's prejudices 
and learning not to inflict them inadvertently on others just is not, in the last 
analysis, seen as terribly important by the higher-order discriminator. That is 
part of what makes him a discriminator in the first place.12 
As I have painted it, then, higher-order discrimination is peculiarly the 
sickness of thoughtful, well-intentioned, and conscientious individuals who 
nevertheless have failed adequately to confront and work through their own 
prejudices or perhaps have been too quickly satisfied by their ability to 
marshall arguments on behalf of doing so. Such individuals are being neither 
disingenuous nor hypocritical when they deny that a person's race, gender, 
sexual orientation, class background, or ethnic or religious affiliation affects 
their judgment of her competence or worth. They vehemently insist that this 
is so, they want it to be so, and they genuinely believe it to be so. They are, 
nevertheless, mistaken. Their efforts to explain away each manifest expression 
of higher-order discrimination on different and inconsistent grounds are 
unconvincing. And their behavior exhibits a degree of otherwise inexplicable 
arbitrariness and idiosyncracy that severely strains our attempts to apply the 
principle of charity in making sense of it. Hence, in order to understand the 
behavior of higher-order discriminators, we must watch what they do, not 
what they say.13 
6. Some Familiar Examples of Higher-Order Discrimination 
These attitudes may find expression in an expectation of greater 
deference or genuflection from a member of the disvalued group. The simple 
first-order discriminator expresses his anger at the violation of this 
expectation in certain familiar stereotypes: the "uppity nigger" whose refusal 
                                                
12
 Here I think it would be wrong to interpret the higher-order discriminator as 
concerned only with personal problems and not with social ones. Rather, the higher-
order discriminator belittles the importance of addressing a certain personal problem. 
13
 One implication of characterizing higher-order discrimination as a sickness rather 
than as a fault is that higher-order discriminators are, in the last analysis, not morally 
responsible for their behavior. This conclusion seems unpalatable in many respects. 
Nevertheless, I am reluctantly pessimistic about the efficacy of appeals to reason in 
higher-order discriminators. Because their reason, or rather their clogged 
pseudorationality, is so inherently a part of the problem, I am inclined to think that the 
solution should be sought in the adoption of some version of Strawson's "objective 
attitude" toward them, i.e., that higher-order discriminators must be managed, perhaps 
psychotherapeutically, rather than addressed. I suggest an explanation for this kind of 
intractability in Piper 1985 and 1988. 
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to behave subserviently is seen as impudence or disrespect, or the "Jewish 
American Princess," whose assertiveness, presumption of self-worth, and 
expectation of attention and respect is seen as a sign of being spoiled, selfish, 
or imperious. But for the higher-order discriminator, such anger is displaced 
into more subtle but similar reactions. Such an individual may just feel 
angered or personally affronted by a woman's presumption of equality in 
personal, social, or intellectual status or in professional worth or as a 
competitor for social or professional rewards, or he may feel unduly irritated 
by her failure to defer or back down in argument. She may be viewed as 
forward in conversation, when in fact she contributes no more and no less 
than anyone else, or stubborn, unresponsive, or impervious to well-
intentioned criticisms, when in fact the only acceptable response to those 
criticisms, in the eyes of the higher-order discriminator, would be for her to 
concur with them wholeheartedly and apologize for her dereliction. Or, to 
take another example, the higher-order discriminator may feel invaded or 
compromised by a black person's jocularity or willingness to trade friendly 
insults that one accepts as a matter of course from those considered to be one's 
peers. The black person may be viewed as overly familiar, insolent, or 
presumptuous. In all such cases the disvaluee's behavior is seen as a 
presumption, not a right or an accepted practice.14 The higher-order 
discriminator is tortured by the suspicion that he is somehow being ridiculed 
or shown insufficient respect or that the disvaluee's conduct bespeaks 
contempt. 
In a recent compelling analysis of anger (1984), N. J. H. Dent suggests that 
anger is based ultimately on feelings of personal inferiority. These lead one to 
overestimate the importance of others' expressions of regard and esteem for 
one, which in turn multiplies the number of occasions in which one feels 
slighted when such expressions are not forthcoming or are of insufficient 
magnitude relative to one's importunate requirements. This oversensitivity to 
being slighted in turn provokes in one the desire to rectify one's situation 
through retaliation by lashing out at the offender. This analysis by itself does 
not, I think, cover all cases of anger, nor does it explain the origins of simple 
first-order discrimination. But it does provide insight into why higher-order 
discriminators, like simple first-order discriminators, are apt to become so 
angry so often at imagined slights from seemingly arrogant disvaluees. The 
more inferior one feels, the more expressions of esteem one requires. And the 
more inferior one perceives a disvaluee to be, the more elaborate the 
disvaluee's expression of esteem of one is required to be. Whereas a friendly 
                                                
14
 The view of the disvaluee's assumption of equality as a presumption may explain the 
higher-order discriminator's otherwise inexplicable umbrage at being complimented by 
a disvaluee: an inferior is in no position to confer favors of any kind. 
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nod from a perceived superior is sufficient to transport one to a state of bliss, 
anything less than a full-length obeisance from a perceived inferior appears to 
be an insult.15 In all such cases, irascibility regularly directed at particular 
members of disvalued groups should not be dismissed as simply an 
idiosyncracy of character, even if it is not intentionally directed at members of 
disvalued groups as such. It is nevertheless an overt expression of higher-
order discrimination. 
A second, related example of behavior and judgments distorted by 
higher-order discrimination is the treatment of disvaluees in a way that 
would constitute a clear insult or faux pas if the person so treated were one of 
one's recognized peers. For example, a white Gentile may privately make an 
anti-Semitic remark to a black colleague in a misguided effort to establish 
rapport, whereas such a remark would be seen as a serious social lapse even 
among other white Gentiles. Or a heterosexual may make gratuitous 
disparaging remarks to a gay colleague about her work or job performance of 
a sort designed to "cut her down to size" rather than to provide constructive 
criticism. Or a man may make offensively personal remarks to a woman 
colleague about her physical appearance, personal life, or manner of dress, of 
a sort that would be highly inappropriate if they were made to another man. 
Or he might expect from a woman colleague extra forbearance for fits of 
temper or irresponsible conduct, or he might expect extraordinary 
professional demands that he would not from a man. The higher-order 
discriminator, in other social contexts, may be acclaimed quite rightly as a 
"prince among men." To disvaluees, however, he reveals himself as Mr. 
Hyde.16 Yet unlike President Lyndon Johnson, who conferred with his cabinet 
through an open bathroom door while uninhibitedly and indiscreetly 
performing his morning ablutions, the higher-order discriminator cannot be 
supposed to commit these boorish excesses with any offensive intent. Rather, 
he regards his response to a person's disvalued attributes as socially 
                                                
15
 In the deep South up to the mid 1960s, for example, for a black person to meet the 
gaze of a white person was perceived as an offense, and for a black man even to look at 
a white woman was to invite lynching. 
16
 This often creates additional difficulties in identifying cases of higher-order 
discrimination for what they are. The testimony of a disvaluee suffers a credibility 
problem at the outset. This problem is severely exacerbated if the testimony concerns a 
higher-order discriminator whom others have every reason to regard as a saint. Under 
these circumstances any charge of inconsistency - whether it conies from others and 
targets the disvaluee or comes from the disvaluee and targets the higher-order 
discriminator - is in the eye of the beholder. For higher-order discriminators regard 
coarse, tasteless, or brutal behavior toward disvaluees as called forth by them and so as 
warranted and hence as fully consistent with highly refined manners and courtly 
civility toward others. 
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innocuous, as an acceptable variation in social etiquette keyed to the 
variations among the personality traits of different individuals. 
A third example of judgments and behavior poisoned by higher-order 
discrimination is the kind of arbitrariness in evaluating a person's assets and 
liabilities as a member of one's group or community mentioned earlier: 
attributes that would qualify as assets in a value or impartially considered 
individual are liabilities in a disvaluee, and attributes that would qualify as 
liabilities in a disvaluee or impartially considered individual are assets in a 
valuee. For instance, a disvaluee being considered for a creative writing 
instructorship may be belittled on grounds that she is merely "clever," 
"bright," or "a hard worker," whereas a valuee showing the same traits may be 
congratulated on his resourcefulness, intelligence, and drive. Or a potential 
law partner who is a valuee and is "long on ideas but short on argument" may 
be praised for her creativity, while a similarly situated disvaluee may be 
suspected of underlying incompetence. 
A fourth example of such distorted behavior is the implicit treatment of 
disvaluees as being obligated by different rules of conduct than those that 
govern oneself and those considered to be one's peers. Among one's peers, 
humor or irreverence at the expense of some sacred relic - a work, personage, 
or achievement in one's field - may be an acceptable source of entertainment, 
while such humor on the part of a disvaluee is a sacrilege, personal affront, or 
iconoclasm that expresses the same lack of respect as that manifested in the 
"presumption" of equality. Or one may apply different criteria of 
interpretation of the behavior of disvaluees. Whereas enigmatic behavior by 
valuees is excused, overlooked, or given the benefit of the doubt, similar 
behavior on the part of disvaluees is interpreted as proof of vice or 
malevolence. This interpretation motivates the higher-order discriminator not 
only to avoid but also to justify the avoidance of direct interaction with the 
disvaluee and thus to avoid the conflict of conscience described earlier. Or one 
may apply rules of honor, loyalty, and responsibility only to those considered 
to be one's peers but may have no scruples about betraying the trust or 
confidentiality of a disvaluee, who is implicitly viewed as unentitled to such 
consideration. Alternatively, one may hold disvaluees to far more stringent 
moral standards than the members of one's own community in fact practice 
among themselves. Any violation of these standards by the disvaluee then 
creates an irradicable moral blemish to which the valuees are not vulnerable 
by reason of their status as valuees. These cases express quite clearly the 
conviction that disvaluees just do not have quite that same status, and hence 
are not to be subject to the same standards of treatment, as members of one's 
recognized community. And at the same time the higher-order discriminator 
vehemently and in all honesty denies that any such discrimination is taking 
place. Indeed, in all of these examples the higher-order discriminator may 
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sincerely deny that the person's race, gender, sexual orientation, class 
background, ethnic or religious affiliation, etc., arbitrarily influences his 
evaluations when his behavior shows patently that they do. 
 
7. Abettors of Higher-Order Discrimination 
There are many forces that may intensify higher-order discrimination and 
its social consequences. Among them are, first and foremost, complicitous 
institutional practices. Individuals in positions of responsibility often rank 
their personal and social allegiances ahead of their professional obligation to 
protect disvaluees from the pernicious effects of higher-order discrimination. 
Or they effectively reward higher-order discrimination by regularly 
interpreting instances of it as expressions of professional autonomy and 
refusing in principle to scrutinize suspected instances of it on the grounds that 
doing so would be unwarranted interference in an organization's internal 
affairs. These institutions often comply with the letter of anti-discriminatory 
policies by hiring members of disvalued groups to temporary positions of 
high public visibility. Since such individuals are regularly replaced by other, 
equally competent but equally transient members of the same disvalued 
group, that group's visibility within the institution can be maintained without 
dismantling the entrenched system of discrimination through permanent or 
seniority status. This is to abdicate the responsibility for enforcing those anti-
discriminatory policies to which such institutions publicly claim to be 
committed. 
Second, there is the intellectual resourcefulness of the higher-order 
discriminator. Someone who is in fact deeply invested in the disvaluational 
status of some primary attribute may always recruit some further, equally 
irrelevant attribute to explain her seemingly irrational judgment and thus 
deflect the charge of higher-order discrimination. It may be said, for example, 
that the disvalued attribute is not a person's race, gender, sexual orientation, 
class background, or ethnic or religious affiliation but rather his inability to 
"fit in," "get along with others," or "be a team player." This is a particularly 
familiar and dependable response because the evidence for ascribing this 
attribute may be materially coextensive with the evidence for disvaluing the 
primary attribute at issue. Since the disvaluee is in theory held to the same 
standards of conduct that govern others in the community but is in fact 
expected to conform to different ones tailored to his disvalued status, his 
inability to "fit in" can be guaranteed at the outset.17 
                                                
17
 Under these circumstances the disvaluee too may be rightly accused of pseudo-
rationality if his personal investment in the theoretical standards of equal treatment is 
so great that he rationalizes, dissociates, or denies the facts of discrimination that 
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A third force that intensifies higher-order discrimination is the repressive, 
pseudorational habits of rationalization, dissociation, and denial already 
discussed. Earlier I suggested that higher-order discriminators were generally 
well-intentioned individuals who had failed to come to terms with their own 
prejudices. I also mentioned some possible reasons for this failure, among 
them first-order discrimination, avoidance of conflicts of conscience, and 
feelings of personal inferiority. Another reason that should not be neglected is 
that higher-order discriminators tend to rationalize, dissociate, or deny the 
very existence of higher-order discrimination itself. They might claim, for 
example, that the phenomenon I have described is in truth simple sensitivity 
to subtle variations and qualities among individuals, all of which might be 
relevant to questions of value or competence in a sufficiently broad sense. Or 
they might agree that higher-order discrimination exists but dissociate it from 
their own motives and behavior as an anomalous phenomenon that is too rare 
to merit further scrutiny. Or they might just flatly deny the existence of 
anything like what I have described as higher-order discrimination and deny 
as well the undeniably familiar instances of it that I have invoked to anchor 
the foregoing analysis. These tactics reinforce the tendencies of higher-order 
discriminators to deny their own collusion in the practice of higher-order 
discrimination and to deny or minimize their need to come to terms with it. 
Higher-order discriminators are adept at the tactics of pseudorationality 
because they have so much self-esteem to lose by modifying their beliefs. But 
we need not be taken in. For above all, higher-order discriminators need to 
understand that no one is fooled by their tactics. With the aid of this 
understanding, they may someday learn to stop fooling themselves. 
 
8. Higher-Order Discrimination: A Case of n-Level Pseudorationality 
Higher-order discrimination is an identifiable moral vice that is 
generically related to, but essentially unlike, such familiar moral vices as self-
deception, hypocrisy, deceit, and weakness of will. It is related to the latter in 
involving an obfuscation of the self and of reality in ways that are 
simultaneously destructive and self-serving. But higher-order discrimination 
is unlike these in that it is a moral vice of a purely intellectual kind. In 
hypocrisy and deceit, for example, we speak or behave in ways that 
communicate falsehoods to others for reasons of self-interest. And in 
weakness of will our rational beliefs are corrupted and overridden by illicit 
emotions. In each of these familiar cases our rational capacities are corrupted 
                                                                                                     
blatantly confront him. But I argue in Piper, unpublished, that self-preservation requires 
that although such ideals must ultimately die, they must not do so without a long and 
painful struggle. 
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or distorted by some other motivational component of the self - our desires, 
interests, or emotions. 
First-order discrimination is similar to self-deception, hypocrisy, and 
weakness of will in this respect. The first-order discriminator perverts the 
purpose of her moral theory by treating it as conferring honorific status on 
people like her. So she truncates the scope of her moral theory by confining its 
application to people like her. Thus she views others who are not like her as 
anomalies that threaten it. Involved in this perception of others are fear and 
anger, in addition to the feelings of personal inferiority earlier discussed. The 
first-order discriminator then eradicates these anomalies by pseudorationally 
dissociating or rationalizing them, and this too can be best understood as 
involving deep emotions that would require a separate paper to explore. For 
my purposes here the point is simply that these emotions and reactions 
subvert the capacity to think clearly and rationally about the situation at 
hand. 
By contrast, in higher-order discrimination, rationality is superveniently 
self-subverting. Having perverted the scope of her moral theory in the service 
of irrational fears of another's appearance of difference, the higher-order 
discriminator is now beset by the reproaches of her moral theory itself for 
having done so. Her personal investment in the truncated version of the 
theory explains away her first-order discrimination against the disvaluees that 
theory excludes, while her higher-level personal investment in the 
comprehensive moral theory compels her to deny her own first-level violation 
of it. Therefore, what motivates higher-order discrimination is ultimately the 
discriminator's pseudorational application of her moral theory to her own 
first-level pseudorationalization of that theory. She becomes a higher-level 
pseudorationalizer by denying her own first-level pseudorationality at 
increasingly removed intellectual levels. Call this n-level pseudorationality. I 
think that n-level pseudorationality is the kind of thing we have in mind 
when we say of a person that he is "out of touch with his feelings." 
Higher-order discrimination is not the only example of n-level 
pseudorationality. As an alternative, consider self-deception, in which a 
person pseudorationalizes her perceptions of herself and her relations to 
others because she is personally invested in a truncated theory of who she is, 
i.e., in a personal self-conception. By itself this is a case of first-level 
pseudorationality. But if her personal self-conception includes the trait of 
being particularly committed to self-knowledge, she may pseudorationalize 
her first-level pseudorationality, for example, by rationalizing her first-level 
denial of unpleasant facts as an instance of merely refusing to dwell on what 
is unimportant or irrelevant and then dissociating her rationalization from her 
theory of self-scrutiny as an isolated and atypical mental glitch. And so on. 
We might describe this as higher-order self-deception. Higher-order self-
deception would be an instance of n-level pseudorationality. The differences 
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among cases of pseudorationality and among cases of n-level 
pseudorationality have to do not with differences in the strategies deployed 
but rather in the particular theories perverted by it. Whereas self-deception 
perverts a theory of who one is as an individual, first-order discrimination 
perverts a theory of who persons are and how they are to be treated. And 
whereas higher-order self-deception pseudorationalizes one's pseudorational 
theory of who one is, higher-order discrimination pseudorationalizes one's 
pseudo-rational theory of who persons are and how they are to be treated. 
So higher-order discrimination is but one instance of a perfectly general 
tendency, first, to attempt psychologically to explain away anomalies that 
intrude into, disrupt, or disconfirm our most favored theories and then, 
having done so, to explain that away as well. We see the workings of n-level 
pseudorationality as clearly in theory-building in the social and natural 
sciences as we do in human interaction in the social and political sphere. In all 
such cases it is not difficult to imagine the survival value such a tendency may 
once have had and may still have under certain conditions.18 Because of our 
limited cognitive capacities, prereflective higher-order discrimination and 
first-order discrimination as well are probably unavoidable. Only those who 
have a deep personal investment in a comprehensive moral theory will feel 
obliged, on reflection, to modify them. 
                                                
18
 In Piper 1988 I argue that the internal consistency of our theories about ourselves and 
the world are necessary conditions for what I call literal self-preservation, i.e., the 
theoretically rational unity and integrity of the self, and that we are often prepared to 
sacrifice the integrity of those theories themselves to achieve this. 
